



European Contribution to UNIFIL: Towards a Better Local Integration

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European Contribution to UNIFIL: Towards a Better Local Integration

Alex Issa

A better understanding of the situation
on the ground for a more effective mission.¹

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1 The information shared in this research is based on knowledge obtained through a six-month long fieldwork in Lebanon. During this period, the researcher conducted seventy interviews with various actors ranging from UNIFIL agents (international or local, civilian or soldier) to foreign and domestic diplomats, Lebanese politicians and locals. With the interviews, conclusions from participant observation exercises form the basis of the research.

Part I – State of play:

The Establishment and the Evolution of UNIFIL

Lebanon plays host to an important number of Palestinian refugees, 110,000 of whom were forced to flee their homes following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. On 14 March 1978, the Israeli army invaded South Lebanon as a response to an attack launched by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then based in Lebanon. The United Nations Security Council met on March 19, 1978 and decided, through resolution 425, to establish an interposition force between Lebanon and Israel. The force's mandate was to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli troops, on the one hand, and to defend the Lebanese government's sovereignty over South Lebanon, on the other. Thus, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was born. On March 21, 1978, the Israeli Minister of Defense ordered a ceasefire and put an end to the Israeli offensive. In June of the same year, the Israeli army withdrew from South Lebanon.² This withdrawal, however, did not end the mandate of the UN provisional force.

The Israeli government did not achieve its goals in the 1978 offensive; Palestinian resistance remained active in Lebanon as 358,207 Palestinians were in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Another offensive operation against Lebanon was thus seen as a potential solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On June 6, 1982, hours after the announcement of Operation Peace for Galilee (the Israeli invasion of Lebanon), Israeli troops quickly completed an occupation of the entire region surrounding the river.³ The occupation was completed



Map showing the Litani River⁶

despite the presence of UNIFIL, who found themselves unable to adequately respond. UNIFIL's failure to prevent the invasion was recognized in the Security Council and, deciding that UNIFIL was not in a position to fulfill its mandate, the Security Council adopted on Resolution 511 on 18 June 1982, authorizing the force to perform the tasks described in the Secretary-General's report⁴ and primarily limiting the intervention to humanitarian assistance—UNIFIL was neither mandated, nor prepared, to military intervene in the conflict. Its role was restricted to ensure that civilians wouldn't be further affected by the conflict and the occupation.⁵

The Israeli army occupied the South Litani region from 1982 to 2000. During the occupation, UNIFIL tried to ensure the protection of local populations despite its limited capacities. Many Israeli atrocities were committed during this period, the most infamous being perhaps the 1996 Cana Massacre when the Israeli army bombed UNIFIL's Fijian camp that hosted civilians fleeing the attacks. UNIFIL's interference on many occasions to help local populations was also a key factor in stopping Israel from imprisoning local populations in the Khiam concentration camp. Moreover, UNIFIL's Blue Helmets, mostly the Irish and the Norwegians,

4 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 11 June 1982, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/30349?ln=en>

5 Cohen, Samy. "Tshal ou la stratégie de la 'riposte disproportionnée'", Les cahiers de l'Orient. CERPO, 2009.

6 "Lebanon approves army deployment". http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4799527.stm.

did not hesitate to offer social and economic help to local populations through their own means, such as providing winter clothes to orphans, treatment for snakebites and books for students, to name but a few initiatives.

On April 17, 2000, the Government of Israel officially informed the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan of its intention to withdraw its forces from Lebanon by July 2000 in accordance with Security Council resolutions 425⁷ and 426⁸ (1978). On May 16, 2000, earlier than expected, Israeli forces began to leave their positions in the middle of an exchange of fire, and, on May 25, the Israeli Government informed the Secretary-General that Israel had redeployed its forces in accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 and 426. In preparation for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from South Lebanon, the UN identified and established in June 2000 the “Line of Withdrawal”, or the so-called “Blue Line”, largely conforming to the recognized boundaries of Lebanon. The Blue Line does not represent an international border between the two countries.⁹

This withdrawal of the Israeli army failed to lead to a peace agreement between the two countries. As of today, there is no official border between Lebanon and Israel despite the line drawn by UNIFIL. According to the Lebanese government, recognition of the borders would imply recognition of the State of Israel, which Lebanon refuses to do in light of the continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to this factor there exists the territorial dispute around the Shebaa Farms and the hills of Kfarchouba. This Israeli occupation helps in allowing Hezbollah to justify its existence and its armed struggle, as a resistance against the Israeli occupation. Hezbollah was created to counter the occupation in 1982, and the current occupation of a part of the territory is a key factor in legitimizing Hezbollah’s weapons. The Lebanese government, for its part, considers that the line drawn by UNIFIL is not valid in the territories still occupied.¹⁰ As a matter of fact, these territories are considered by the Lebanese government as part of Lebanon, while Israel considers them as Syrian territories that were annexed during the 1967 War. Thus, Lebanon declares the Israeli withdrawal as incomplete. In addition, the Lebanese government is unable to establish its sovereignty over the southern region of Litani. It was not until 2006 that the Lebanese army moved to the region after the Security Council voted resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006.¹¹ Since 2006, UNIFIL, the Lebanese army, and Hezbollah—in addition to Palestinian refugees in camps—have been present in South Litani, creating a complex environment for stability and peacekeeping.

The 2006 War and the New Mandate

On July 12, 2006, three Israeli soldiers were killed and Hezbollah kidnapped two others during a fire exchange on the Lebanese-Israeli line. After a month of war between Israel and Hezbollah, on August 11, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted an amended version of the draft resolution; the Lebanese government and Hezbollah accepted Resolution 1701 the following day. The latter agreed to stop fighting if Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon. Then-Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, informed the UN that the resolution was going to be presented to the government, while Israeli bombing was increasing. It was not until August 13 that

7 Resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/425>.

8 Resolution 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/426>.

9 UNIFIL Press Kit, https://unifil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2019_04_11_press_kit.pdf

10 Murphy Ray. “Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Civilian Protection”, *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*. Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 373-402.

11 This resolution will be further analyzed in the following section.

Israel accepted the resolution, ending thirty-four days of fighting.¹²

The war had important consequences for UNIFIL. Possessing around two thousand civilian and military members, UNIFIL failed to prevent the outbreak of the conflict or to intervene, and its role was not only questioned by the Israelis and the Americans due to its failure in preventing Hezbollah from waging war, but also by the Lebanese who considered that it had failed to cope with the Israeli attacks. Its role during the war had been limited to humanitarian assistance to the extent that was possible. Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006 did not dissolve but strengthened UNIFIL. The UN Security Council unanimously declared that the war of 2006 demonstrated that a conflict could break out at any time. During the negotiations in New York, the permanent members of the Security Council affirmed the need to have a reinforced UNIFIL to accompany the Lebanese army in its deployment on the whole of Lebanese territory, in particular in South Lebanon which, up to present, was controlled by Hezbollah. They considered that UNIFIL could not prevent the escalation of the conflict because its mandate, and especially its manpower, did not allow it.

Thus, the Security Council's observation led to the UNIFIL's current mandate:

- Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon;
- Coordinate its activities referred to in the preceding paragraph (above) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area;
- Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related material.¹³

Unlike the previous resolutions, UNIFIL's mandate was strengthened, it was allowed to use armed force to ensure the respect of its mandate, and the number of soldiers—mainly European—was significantly increased.

UNIFIL in 2019: Facts and Numbers


Today, UNIFIL is the only UN peacekeeping operation with a maritime force. With a budget of 480 million dollars, it's composed of around 10,300 military personnel coming from 44 countries and of around 800 civilians. With more than 1300 soldiers, Indonesia tops the list of contributing countries, followed by Italy, an

12 Wilkins Henrietta. "The 2006 war in context", *The making of the Lebanese foreign policy. Understanding the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war*. Routledge, 2013. p.59, p. 64-65.

13 Resolution 1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1701>.

EU country, with 1070 soldiers.¹⁴

The mission conducts a total of 45 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities each day and has spent more than 50 million dollars on these activities since 2006. CIMIC is a component of military action, having as a final purpose the accomplishment of the objectives of all parties involved. This cooperation fulfills the political and military objectives of operations, including political, military, civilian and humanitarian elements, and implies the incorporation of military capabilities into a joint reaction in the face of all types of human needs.¹⁵ Through these activities, the Blue Helmets seek to establish good relations with local populations, which allows them to efficiently execute their mandate and be accepted by the host society. The nature of these activities is diverse and can vary from building roads to providing medical assistance and equipping schools or hospitals, among others. Most of these CIMIC activities are conducted by contributing countries that sufficient budgets, such as South Korea, Italy, Spain and France.¹⁶



Part II – European Presence in UNIFIL

The European Presence in UNIFIL

The European presence in UNIFIL dates back to the mission's establishment in South Lebanon in 1978. Today, as indicated by the map below, UNIFIL's area of operation is divided into two sectors. Italians command Sector West while Sector East is under Spanish command. As for the mission's Force Commander Reserve (FCR), it's held by the French who are helped by the Finnish in an act of solidarity after the 2015 attacks in Paris, allowing the French to send back some of their soldiers to France.¹⁷ The FCR is directly placed under the orders of UNIFIL's Commander. It is UNIFIL's emergency response component and is


14 "UNIFIL Troop-Contributing Countries", UNIFIL, 2019, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-troop-contributing-countries>.

15 "Infographics", UNIFIL, 2019, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/infographics>.

16 Issa, Alex. *La Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban : essai d'explication de la pérennité institutionnelle*. FNSP, 2019. 353 p.

17 *Ibid.*

stationed in Dayr Kifa, 43 kilometers northeast of Naqoura. It is able to intervene on short notice throughout UNIFIL's area of operation to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1701. An operational intervention reserve, it works in close collaboration and coordination with the Lebanese armed forces.¹⁸ As seen in the map, the disputed territories are located in Sector East, commanded by the Spanish battalion. It's particularly in this Sector, whose inhabitants are mostly pro-Hezbollah, that problems occur between locals and European peacekeepers, mainly the Spanish and French.



Map of UNIFIL Deployment ¹⁹

The massive presence of Western peacekeepers creates a deterrent for both Hezbollah and Israel and helps avoid, since 2006 and for the moment, the start of a new conflict between the two actors.²⁰ In fact, given the European countries' diplomatic sway, killing a European soldier could create a diplomatic incident, which both Israel and Hezbollah wish to avoid while trying to legitimize their actions.

Moreover, the European weight in UNIFIL is evidenced by the Force Commander's nationality. Since 2004, the Force Commander has been European and, except for the last Force Commander who was Irish, comes

18 "Liban : La Force Commander Reserve (FCR) patrouille en coordination avec les forces armées libanaises (FAL)", 2014, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/operations/liban-la-force-commander-reserve-fcr-patrouille-en-coordination-avec-les-forces-armees-libanaises-fal>.

19 "UNIFIL Maps", UNIFIL, 2019, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-maps>

20 Ibid.

from a NATO country (France, Spain and Italy).

Period	Name	Country
February 2004 – February 2007	General Alain Pellegrini	France
February 2007 – January 2010	General Claudio Graziano	Italy
January 2010 – January 2012	General Alberto Asarta Cuevas	Spain
January 2012 – July 2014	General Paolo Serra	Italy
July 2014 – July 2016	General Luciano Portolano	Italy
July 2016 – August 2018	General Michael Berry	Ireland
Since August 2018	General Stefano Del Col	Italy

UNIFIL's Force Commanders since 2004²¹

Since the beginning of the mission, European countries have been concerned with maintaining an overall positive image, as shown by the different interviews conducted. For instance, Irish and Norwegian soldiers were well perceived by local populations thanks to their attempts to ensure the protection of the region's inhabitants, as they were well accepted by and integrated with local populations since the beginning with no major incident occurring between them and the locals. Even small contributions such as helping local schools, offering medicine for hospitals or clothes to orphanages, were and still are highly appreciated by local populations.²² As a matter of fact, South Lebanon has always been neglected by the Lebanese government, and under the Israeli occupation the region suffered from a lack of infrastructure that is still observable until today. Thus, UNIFIL is replacing the Lebanese government with such aids, infrastructure-building included, as they're crucial for the region's development. Interviews conducted with locals and mayors confirmed this thesis, as they all insisted on the social, economic and humanitarian impact of UNIFIL as part of the mission's success and acceptance.

CIMIC Activities: A Key for Success and a Tension Generator

CIMIC activities that have been and still are conducted by European soldiers allow them to establish good relations with the host society. Nowadays, Italy, Spain and France are the leading European countries in these activities, given their economic potential and the role they play within UNIFIL as mentioned above. These activities are multiple and are often made on a daily basis. For example, the Italians offered solar energy installations in the city of Tyre while those of Deir Mimas, an Orthodox village, are a gift from the Spanish battalion. Furthermore, the French frequently offer medical care around the villages and in local hospitals. Such activities are always well perceived by local populations.²³ Formal activities conducted by UNIFIL, which are low-budget quick-impact projects, should be distinguished from those informal conducted by contributing countries with an important budget such as installing solar energy in cities and villages. Countries involved in UNIFIL are completely free in choosing where they want to invest. These CIMIC activities aren't

21 Issa, Alex. *La Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban : essai d'explication de la pérennité institutionnelle*. FNSP, 2019. 353 p.

22 Summary of interviews made with local populations.

23 Issa, Alex. *La Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban : essai d'explication de la pérennité institutionnelle*. FNSP, 2019. 353 p.

exclusive to UNIFIL, they're part of the UN peacekeeping doctrine that started to evolve after the end of the Cold War to include notions related to human security.

However, given the particularity of the Lebanese society, despite the good socio-economic impact of these projects, they can create some tensions between local populations and the Blue Helmets. As a matter of fact, the Lebanese society is known for its culture of sectarianism, and South Lebanon hosts a diverse sectarian distribution. This culture of sectarianism, a result of the Anglo-French imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century, was institutionalized in the Lebanese constitution in 1926 under the French mandate—dividing Lebanese society into 18 different sects.²⁴ South Lebanon, with its multi-sectarian dimensions, is part of the system given the mosaic distribution of a mostly Shia population in the region. This complex reality forces UNIFIL to adapt to the situation. Therefore, some nationalities become associated with a particular sect although it is not necessarily intended. Despite helping different inhabitants via the CIMIC activities, some European nationalities are accused of privileging some sects over others, as shown by the different interviews conducted with local populations from different sects. It's mainly the case for the Spanish who are considered to treat Catholics and Maronites differently, or the Serbians who are perceived closer to Orthodox populations.²⁵ For example, Spanish are accused by Muslim populations of preferring businesses like restaurants and markets owned by Christians, while the Serbians' CIMIC activities are mostly conducted in Orthodox villages, such as offering a generator to Deir Mimas' Church.

Misperceptions and Malpractice

Another problem faced by the European soldiers is their own perceptions of the host society. In fact, some soldiers come to South Lebanon with an already erroneous idea of what would their mission be on the ground. The factor explaining this phenomenon is that these European soldiers operate in Hezbollah-controlled areas, and that their perception of Hezbollah, its armed branch being considered a terrorist organization by most of these countries, can influence their behavior vis-à-vis civilian populations. Prior to being deployed in South Lebanon, the soldiers in UNIFIL have had run-ins with other armed groups such as Ansar al-Dine in Mali and the Taliban in Afghanistan. They risk associating the experience of dealing with Hezbollah, an entity that is more than just an armed group, with their prior missions. Matti Lassila, Finnish ambassador to Lebanon, confirms this perception that soldiers may have: "If you are a young Finnish reservist or a professional French soldier and you come for the first time in the region, [...] you have some fear or propaganda that Hezbollah will attack. Is the guy in the BMW a member of Hezbollah? Is he a peaceful citizen? Does he want to blow me up? Four or five months later, the soldiers understand that there is no real risk, that the local people are peaceful and welcoming, but it's too late, because they have to leave soon elsewhere".^{26, 27} Thus, the soldiers come with the mentality of defying Hezbollah in its own area by completely ignoring that it has the quasi-full support of local inhabitants and that it's impossible to tell who is a Hezbollah fighter and who is not. Informal discussions with highly ranked French lieutenants confirmed this assumption: "We're here

24 Makdisi Karim. "Reconsidering the Struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon", Journal of Palestine Studies-University of California Press, 2014. p.24-41.

25 Issa, Alex. La Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban : essai d'explication de la pérennité institutionnelle. FNSP, 2019. 353 p.

26 Lassila, Matti, Finnish Ambassador in Lebanon, interviewed by author, October 11 2017, Beirut.

27 European soldiers rotate each six months, except for the French who do it every four months. Soldiers from other nationalities rotate once a year.

on a mission. No one, not even Hezbollah, shall impose to us what to do or prevent us from doing our job. We'll patrol wherever and whenever we feel it's necessary".²⁸ This mentality can lead to some tensions with local populations who already perceive European soldiers as potential spies for Israel because of their close relationship with Washington, Israel's main international ally. For instance, night patrols conducted by Spanish or French troops always lead to tensions with local populations, as well as taking pictures in what local inhabitants consider as private properties and perceive as spying for Israel. In such cases, disputes emerge and involve the intervention of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL's headquarters. Therefore, in many UNIFIL areas, local inhabitants perceive the operation, and specifically the French and Spanish soldiers, as being there to serve Israel's interests against the host society: "We know they're here to protect Israel, there's no other reason for them to be operating here," is a common statement within the pro-Hezbollah population in Lebanon, repeatedly pronounced in the discussions made during the fieldwork. It also explains why many incidents take place in such areas. One of the most serious incidents involving UNIFIL personnel in recent years occurred on August 4, 2018. Some twenty individuals in civilian clothes stopped a four-vehicle UNIFIL patrol in the village of Majdal Zun, allegedly because the peacekeepers were taking photographs. They broke windows of the patrol vehicles with hammers, shot at two of the vehicles as they sought to disengage and poured gasoline on a vehicle, setting it ablaze.²⁹

This perception by the locals is also due to the practices of some soldiers, mainly the French and Spanish. The field survey revealed a "NATOization" of UNIFIL. This "NATOization" is defined as the influence of NATO practices and experiences on the progress of the UN mission in southern Lebanon, on decision-making, on prioritization, as well as on the behavior of the military in their daily interactions with civilians. The interviews showed that military personnel who have served in NATO operations are applying their NATO practices within UNIFIL, which translates into excessive militarization of the mission such as carrying heavy weapons even while going to the supermarket. This perception of militarization creates a distance, and sometimes tensions, between these soldiers and the other actors, mainly local populations.³⁰ This is the reason why incidents usually take place between local populations and these soldiers mostly in pro-Hezbollah areas, because the already existing perception by the locals is confirmed by an excessively military attitude that can provoke the locals, especially when the soldiers are patrolling in private properties at night or just walking in the local markets with their weapons and taking a military posture even though they are off-duty. This excessively militaristic attitude is the result of both the NATO military doctrine and due to soldiers having served in tense zones such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Instead of changing any negative perceptions the locals might have of the home countries of the soldiers, they reinforce this image and make it harder for their successors who could face problems as soon as they arrive.

28 Informal discussions with French lieutenants on two occasions, January 2018 and January 2019.

29 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 15 November 2018, <https://undocs.org/S/2018/1029>

30 Issa, Alex. *La Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban : essai d'explication de la pérennité institutionnelle*. FNSP, 2019. 353p.

Part III – Policy Recommendations: Towards a Greater Local Integration of the European Soldiers

CIMIC Activities: Better Execution and Communication

CIMIC activities are key for a better acceptance by the local population. They allow the soldiers to show empathy with locals who suffer from a lack of state commitment in the region. To be successful, these activities not only have to be used in accordance to the people's needs, but also be well distributed equally within the different villages and sects to avoid tensions. Coordination with local authorities, whether they're official (such as local municipalities) or not (like schools and hospitals) is already improving and projects are agreed upon to better suit the local needs. An important aspect is therefore the communication. The different battalions usually tend to publish their CIMIC activities on their Facebook page; it would be better thus to equally post what has been done in villages of different sects to show that no discrimination is being made. Moreover, most of the population isn't aware of these pages. For example, a joint Twitter account for the Irish and Polish battalion only has 666 followers, while other battalions like the French and the Spanish do not have their own pages or accounts. Instead, they rely either on their government's pages and accounts, or on UNIFIL-related accounts (the official account or that of the commander in charge of the battalion). An awareness campaign must be made in collaboration with both UNIFIL and local authorities so inhabitants can better understand UNIFIL's commitment in South Lebanon. Such understanding might lead to a better local acceptance of UNIFIL, especially for European countries that are contributing significantly to the region's development and still facing problems with the locals. Moreover, a visible social media presence through Facebook, Instagram and Twitter via official accounts would help the battalions share their activities and actions on the ground.

Better Knowledge of the Operational Environment

Soldiers usually get operational training on the ground before arriving in South Lebanon. However, the training received seems to be either confusing or incomplete, given the problems faced by the soldiers and the misperceptions they have of the South Lebanese society, mostly in the pro-Hezbollah areas. The training should be designed and conducted by people who have been on the ground and have a substantial knowledge of the local society—its specificities and the perceptions by the locals of European countries. The idea behind this is to explain to the soldiers what they have to expect and how to avoid creating problems. Therefore, an efficient training might consist of offering the soldiers a map with the sectarian distribution of the population as well as the main political tendencies according to the regions in South Lebanon. Moreover, an anthropological course on the South Lebanese society would help the soldiers to better understand the situation on the ground, as well as a historic approach to the Israeli-Lebanese conflict and the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon to understand the local populations' perceptions.

The length of the deployment should also be extended. Four months for the French soldiers and six months for other European nationalities do not leave them with enough time to understand the local dynamics and thus to better exercise their mission. A one-year deployment might be a better option so that soldiers would have time to get more accustomed to peacekeeping methods.

Avoiding NATO Practices

South Lebanon is not Afghanistan. European soldiers having frequently served with NATO before their arrival in South Lebanon, used to the practices they learnt during their NATO experiences. However, these

practices don't apply in UNIFIL's case. Therefore, with the training soldiers receive before arriving to South Lebanon, they need to be familiarized with the UN practices (more openness to local populations and to civilian peacekeepers) and to understand not only the local society but also their mandate within the UNIFIL and how they are expected to fulfill it. As a matter of fact, interviews conducted with UNIFIL actors showed a doctrinal difference between NATO and non-NATO countries that lead to some internal tensions on how to conduct the missions. Civilians working with UNIFIL also complained about the excessive military practices of some of the soldiers coming from NATO-allied countries and asserted that these practices lead to avoidable problems.

There's no European coordination and frequently rivalries between the French, Spanish and Italians who are commanding different sectors of the mission. A European coordination could be established to harmonize the policies especially regarding patrolling. CIMIC activities can also be worked on in order to avoid inequalities in help brought to villages, which can be another source of tension between UNIFIL and the locals.

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